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THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND STATE CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUBt
The focus here is upon that aspect of the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins'
doctrine which compels a federal district court, on issues not governed by
federal law, to apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in which it sits.
The purpose is to appraise some of the good and, it is submitted, some
of the bad effects of this aspect of the doctrine, and then to suggest how
realistically, in the light of recent developments, without heroic measures,
the good can be reinforced and the bad eliminated. First, however, it is
necessary to tell enough of the Erie story to provide a background for
what is to follow.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE TEST
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 acted as catalyst for the
controversy which followed: "The laws of the several states, except
where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they ap-
ply."2 In 1948 the words "trials at common law" were changed to "civil
actions,"' thus rendering moot any further debate as to whether the sec-
tion or the doctrine it embodied was applicable to equity cases4 and elim-
inating one possible basis for distinguishing between the mandate of the
statute and the commands of the United States Constitution.5 In its
present form, the section reads: "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply."' 6
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.
3. H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
4. See, e.g., Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940) ("The Rules of Decision
Act does not apply to suits in equity.") ; Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S.
202, 205 (1938) ("The doctrine [Erie] applies though the question of construction
arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity.") ; Mason v. United States, 260
U.S. 545, 559 (1923) (statute merely declarative of the rule which would exist in the
absence of statute; state laws as rules of decision in equity suits not excluded from the
statute by implication).
5. See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doc-
trine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 193 (1957).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
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In Swift v. Tyson 7 an opinion written by Mr. Justice Story, it was
held that "laws," in the introductory phrase of the section, did not in-
clude the decisions of state courts upon matters of general common law
which the federal courts were as competent as the state courts to decide:
It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or
was designed to apply to questions of a more general nature, not
at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed
and permanent operation, as, for example, to the construction
of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and espe-
cially to questions of general commercial law, where the state
tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as our-
selves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instru-
ment, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of
commercial law to govern the case.'
The case involved an interstate transaction, being a suit on a bill of ex-
change dated in M\,Iaine, taken in payment for Maine land, and drawn on
and accepted by the defendant in New York. In holding that a federal
court sitting in New York need not follow the New York rule concerning
the adequacy of a pre-existing debt as consideration to make a taker of
a note one in due course, the rational purpose may have been to foster
uniformity in an area where uniformity then, as now, was very im-
portant to the young nation-interstate commercial transactions. Quite
often, following Swift v. Tyson, this theme of national uniformity was
sounded by the Court. For example, in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh,
holding that a federal court sitting in Ohio need not follow the Ohio
fellow-servant rule as it applied to an action against a railroad for in-
juries suffered by an employee in a collision in Ohio, the court asked, "As
it [the railroad] passes from State to State, must the rights, obligations
and duties subsisting between it and its employees change at every state
line ?,,D Even Mr. Justice Holmes who, in a series of dissents, opposed
extensions of Tyson was willing to acquiesce in its application to "those
principles which it is desirable to make uniform throughout the United
States."10
In fact, however, no such uniformity resulted. The Court stopped
short of requiring the state courts to follow the "general law" as articu-
7. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
S. Id. at 18-19.
9. 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893).
10. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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lated by the federal courts, and the state courts continued to go their own
way. More significantly, the Tyson concept of general law was applied
to essentially intrastate transactions. Horrible examples began to accu-
mulate in which a state rule, applicable to an intrastate transaction, could
be avoided by stepping across the courthouse square into the federal court
under the aegis of diversity jurisdiction. In Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co.,1 involving the duty of a coal company to provide support for sur-
face land during mining operations in West Virginia, the Court refused
to direct a federal court sitting in West Virginia to follow a decision of
West Virginia's highest court, directly in point, which had become final
after suit had been filed in the federal court, but before the decision by
the court of appeals. 2 Probably the best known of the "horrible ex-
amples" is Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Bror n & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co." In this case, a Kentucky corporation, by the
device of dissolving and re-incorporating in Tennessee, was permitted to
manufacture diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and to enforce in a
federal court, sitting in Kentucky, a contract made and to be performed
in Kentucky which no Kentucky state court would have enforced.
The situation was intolerable, as many recog-nized. 4 The forum-
shopping involved was bad, but much worse, at the core of the problem
was the fact that individuals, in their everyday activities and dealings,
were subjected to two inconsistent bodies of law. At the nadir of Black
& White Taxicab, Tyson entered its last decade. It was slain by the
sledge hammer blows of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.5
Mr. Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was walking alongside de-
fendant's railroad tracks in Pennsylvania 'when he was struck by some
projection from a passing train. On the basis of diversity of citizenship,
plaintiff sued the railroad in a federal court in New York. The defend-
ant urged that under Pennsylvania law the plaintiff, being a trespasser,
could not recover. This point of Pennsylvania law was disputed, but in
deciding to affirm a verdict for the plaintiff, the court of appeals held
that it was unnecessary to consider whether the Pennsylvania law was as
defendant had contended, because the question was one of general law
11. 215 U.S. 349 (1910).
12. For a post-Erie case to the contrary on the duty of a federal court to conform
to state decisions pendente lite see Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S.
538 (1941).
13. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
14. See, e.g., Mills, Should Federal Courts Igtwre State Laws?, 34 Am. L. Rv. 51,
68-69 (1900) (urging amendment of the Judiciary Act to compel federal courts to use
as rules of decision both "statutes and decisions of the courts of last resort of such
States").
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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upon which the federal courts were free to exercise their independent
judgment. Upon certiorari being granted, the parties focused their argu-
ments on the extent of the Tyson doctrine. Mr. Justice Brandeis, how-
ever, seized the opportunity to overrule Tyson.
Charles Warren had demonstrated that, in the original draft of Sec-
tion 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the words "statute law" and "un-
written or common law" had been stricken and the single word "laws"
inserted in their place.' But Mr. Justice Brandeis was not content to
overturn Tyson simply on a matter of statutory construction. In his
much-debated dictum he said:
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the
course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.
... . Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall
be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether
they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial
law or part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."'
The case was remanded to the court of appeals with directions to deter-
mine the issue of state law it had thought irrelevant. 8
Ironically, less than five months after the Erie opinion, the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. The stage was thus set
for exploring in depth the "substance"-"procedure" dichotomy in the
context of Erie and the Judiciary Act. To what extent would federal
courts now be free to apply the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
other rules and procedures formerly common in those courts and to what
extent would these rules and procedures have to be displaced by state law?
WVhat was to be "procedural" and what "substantive?"
The first battle was a victory for the new rules. Sibbach v. Wilson
16. C. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 H~aw. L. REv. 49, 86 (1923).
17. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
18. Id. at 80.
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& Co.10 held that a federal district court could, pursuant to rule 35, -0
order the plaintiff in a personal injury suit to submit to a physical ex-
amination by a court-appointed physician, despite the fact that such an
order could not be made in a state court in the state in which the case was
tried. The Court found that the rule was within the mandate of the
statute authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe uniform rules of civil
procedure for the federal district courts: "Said rules shall neither abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."'" The plain-
tiff was wrong in translating "substantive" into "important' or "sub-
stantial.
22
It was apparent, however, that deeper analysis would soon be re-
quired. "Substance" and "procedure" are chameleon-like words, chang-
ing their meaning dramatically with changed context. The Court had
yet to indicate what meaning they were to bear in this new context.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co."2 pointed the direction in
which the Court was to move. Pursuant to an agreement executed in
New York, a New York corporation transferred its business to a Dela-
ware corporation. The Delaware corporation was to use its best efforts
to further the manufacture and sale of certain patented devices and the
New York corporation was to have a share of the profits. The assets
were transferred in New York and performance was commenced there.
Subsequently, the New York corporation sued the Delaware corporation
in a Delaware federal court for violating the agreement. Upon recover-
ing judgment, plaintiff moved for addition of interest under the New
York Civil Practice Act. Without inquiry into what a Delaware court
would have done, the federal court granted the motion. The Supreme
Court reversed. Delaware was not constitutionally compelled to apply
the New York rule on interest and therefore, under the Erie doctrine, the
federal court was bound to determine and to follow the Delaware con-
flicts rule.24 "Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and
federal courts sitting side by side."2
In the same vein, stressing the avoidance of a different result being
19. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
21. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064.
22. 312 U.S. at 11.
23. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
24. On remand, the court below reached the same result, finding "from all the
available data" that a Delaware court would probably apply the New York rule on
interest as "substantive." Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 685 (1942).
25. 313 U.S. at 496.
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reached in a federal court than would have been reached in a state court
in the state where the federal court was sitting, the Court decided a series
of cases resulting in what has come to be called the "outcome-
determinative" test for application of the Erie doctrine. It was held that
in a suit by a stakeholder under the Federal Interpleader Act,26 despite
the nation-wide service of process provided in the act, the federal district
court would have to reach the same result as would be reached in the
state courts of the state in which it sat.27  Similarly, the burden of prov-
ing contributory negligence was governed by local state law even though,
under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," contributory
negligence had to be pleaded as an affirmative defense.29 Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York," in holding that in a diversity case the federal court cannot
try a case barred by the state statute of limitations, stated the outcome-
determinative test in classic fashion. "In essence, the intent of that de-
cision [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is ex-
ercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litiga-
tion, as it would be if tried in a State court."'" In further applications
of this doctrine, the Court held that in diversity cases a federal court must
obey a state forum-closing rule;32 that although Rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states that "filing a complaint with the court"
commences an action,3 such filing does not toll the local statute of limi-
tations if the state rule is that service of the summons is required for
tolling ; 3 that if the state court is closed to a plaintiff who has not quali-
fied to do business within the state, the federal court is likewise closed ;3"
that a state statute requiring a plaintiff in a derivative stockholder's ac-
tion to give security for costs at the demand of the corporation must be
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958).
27. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
29. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). See also Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) ("presumptions (and their effects) and burden of
proof are 'substantive"'); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939)
(burden of proof in equity action to remove cloud on title).
30. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
31. Id. at 109.
32. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947).
33. FED. R. Crv. P. 3.
34. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See
also Netermyer v. Henley, 205 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ind. 1962), reluctantly following
Ragan although the court questions the justice of the result.
35. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
233
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followed, although no such requirement is contained in rule 23 ;30 and
in what may be the high water mark of the outcome-determinative test in
the Supreme Court, that if the state court would not stay a suit pending
arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract being liti-
gated, the federal court should not do so."7
There are many questions concerning application of this outcome-
determinative test which are still open, causing debate and often disagree-
ment in the lower courts. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.3" left
open the question of whether, in a diversity case, a state or a federal
standard should determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
jury verdict. 9 Other problems which have raised the question of whether
a federal or state standard is applicable include the permissibility of a
verdict in excess of the ad damnum clause,4" judicial notice of the law of
a sister state,4" indispensability of parties,42 election of remedies,43 and
admissibility of evidence.4 There is almost no extreme to which the
outcome-determinative argument has not been pushed. It has been held
that, in a diversity case, a federal court should look to local state law in
determining whether to afford relief under the federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act.45 It has even been urged, unsuccessfully, that despite rule
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949).
37. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
38. 359 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. Buckley, 317 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1963) (quantity and
quality of proof necessary to make out a case for submission to a jury-federal
standard) ; Safeway Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962) (quantum of proof
necessary to sustain a cause of action-federal standard) ; 5 MooRz, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1 38.10 (2d ed. 1951) (discussing split of authority in courts of appeal and advocating a
federal standard).
40. Riggs, Ferris & Geer v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum)
(federal).
41. See, e.g., Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962) (federal);
Reeves v. Schulmeier, 303 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962) (federal); 1A MooRE, FEDERAL
PRA cTIcE 0.316[4], at 3523 (2d ed. 1961) (consensus for federal standard).
42. Resnick v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1961) (federal).
43. Berger v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1961)
(state).
44. See, e.g., Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.
1961) (whether others associated plaintiff with alleged libel-federal) ; Dallas County
v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) (hearsay-federal);
Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960) (pre-trial examina-
tion-federal) ; Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1962)
(physician-patient privilege-state); Car & Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Goldstein, 179 F. Supp.
888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd iner., 277 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960) (lawyer-client privilege
-state); Ladd, Uniform Evidence Riles it; the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REv. 692
(1963); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
45. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960). But see Horton
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 360 (1961) (dissent): "Whether or not such
relief should be granted does not depend upon whether the state courts would exercise
their discretion to grant a declaratory judgment in the same situation."
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41 (b)," state law determines whether a federal court may dismiss on the
merits for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.4"
From such decisions the question naturally arises whether there is
any logical stopping point for the outcome-determinative test. Any differ-
ence in method of administering justice might be outcome-determinative.
Would the bubble be blown until it burst or would it continue to grow
until, at least in diversity cases, it strangled the last vestige of independ-
ent responsibility of federal courts for the integrity and economy of judi-
cial administration in those courts? Moreover, the implications of the
answer to this question extend even beyond diversity cases. Although
it is largely in diversity cases that the gloss upon Erie has been written,
the Judiciary Act does not so limit its "rules of decision" section and it
would seem that the Erie doctrine, whatever it may come to be, or, per-
haps more correctly, a close analogue of it, is applicable in all situations
where federal courts turn to state law to supply the rule for decision be-
cause "the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Con-
gress" do not "otherwise require or provide,"4 whatever the basis for
federal jurisdiction."'
II. BYRD: NEW LIGHT OR FALSE TRAIL?
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc." is the case which, at
least on the surface, seemed to provide the pin to prick the bubble. The
plaintiff, employed by an electric contractor, was injured while doing a
job contracted for by the defendant. Under the South Carolina work-
men's compensation act, the plaintiff recovered benefits from the electric
contractor. Then the plaintiff, on the jurisdictional basis of diversity of
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
47. Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
49. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943): "Erie R. Co. v.
Tomplins . . .did not free the federal courts from the duty of deciding questions of state
law in diversity cases. Instead it placed on them a greater responsibility for determining
and applying state laws in all cases within their jurisdiction in which federal law does
not govern;" Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
909 (1952); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Eric v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 281 (1946); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL Svs'mi 697 (1953); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A
Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248, 257 (1963) ; cf. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959)
(effect of illegality under a federal statute a matter of federal law, even in diversity
actions) ; Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956)
(in action for alleged conversion of bonds of federal agency, burden of proof and good
faith issues governed by state law, but not whether bonds overdue). But see Rothen-
berg v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1950) (since not a diversity case,
remedy not barred in federal court although barred in state court) ; GoODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 44-45 (3d ed. 1949).
50. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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citizenship, sued the defendant in a federal court in South Carolina for
common-law negligence. The defense was that plaintiff's exclusive rem-
edy against defendant was under the South Carolina workmen's com-
pensation act, a remedy which plaintiff had already exhausted. Under
the South Carolina statute, the question of whether the defendant was
entitled to the limited and definite liability of an employer depended up-
on whether in fact the defendant had in the past performed work for it-
self similar to the work it had here contracted to the company for which
plaintiff worked." The court of appeals decided this fact question ad-
versely to the plaintiff and rendered judgment for the defendant. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that in a federal court the fact issue
should have been submitted to a jury, even though under South Carolina
practice such issues in workmen's compensation cases were decided by the
court. In the course of his opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan
uttered words which were manna for those who thought that the outcome-
determinative test had been carried to undesirable extremes:
Therefore, were "outcome" the only consideration, a strong case
might appear for saying that the federal court should follow
the state practice.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. The federal system is an independent system for admin-
istering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdic-
tion. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner
in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial func-
tions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not
the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the deci-
sions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. 2
It might appear, then, that the way was open for viewing the outcome-
determinative gloss upon Erie as a policy against forum-shopping between
a state court and a federal court in the same state, which, as a policy,
might, in appropriate circumstances, yield to sufficient "countervailing
considerations."
Even in the Byrd opinion, however, this hope of mitigating the
outcome-determinative test was dimmed by indications that the "counter-
vailing considerations" language was very limited in scope and not a
broad mandate for change. The result was reached "under the influ-
ence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment." If there ever
was doubt, it now seems clear, in light of subsequent Supreme Court de-
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-11 (1962).
52. 356 U.S. at 537.
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cisions, that the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution53
required the Byrd result. 4  Moreover, Byrd's reliance on "countervailing
considerations" was hedged by a statement that the South Carolina prac-
tice of deciding such fact questions by judge rather than jury "appears
to be merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity . . . and not
a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of rights and obliga-
tions of the parties." 5  Further, Mr. Justice Brennan did not think the
right to trial by jury rather than judge was very likely to affect the out-
come, in view of the extensive powers of a federal judge to comment on
the evidence and witnesses and to grant a new trial if the verdict seemed
to him contrary to the weight of the evidence.5
Despite these built-in limitations on Byrd as a possible change in the
outcome-determinative doctrine, a few circuit court decisions have seized
upon the "countervailing considerations" language as an aid in rejecting
arguments made under the Erie gloss,5" and some commentators see in
Byrd hope for basic shifts in attitude.5 Even if the "countervailing con-
siderations" concept of Byrd is a viable basis for relief from an over-
rigid outcome-determinative rule, however, it is likely to be largely limited
to preserving those aspects of federal trial court procedures and practices
essential to the integrity and economy of judicial administration in the
federal courts as a separate system. Further encroachment of Erie on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be prevented, but much beyond
this, concerning rules traditionally deemed "substantive," the reform
value of Byrd is, at best, doubtful. 9
53. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
54. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (in federal courts, in diversity as
well as other actions, right to a jury trial determined as a matter of federal law under
the seventh amendment); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.,
369 U.S. 355 (1962) (suit by longshoreman on law side of federal court by reason of
diversity carried with it a right to trial by jury under the seventh amendment) ; A. E.
Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation,
36 TuL. L. R~v. 443, 451 (1962); Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh
Auzendiment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 549, 560-61
(1959).
55. 356 U.S. at 536. See also Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 360 U.S. 273
(1959).
56. 356 U.S. at 539-40 (1958).
57. See Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1962) (rejecting argument that,
despite improper venue, federal court must hear case if state court would) ; Monarch
Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1960) (may admit pre-trial
examination in evidence even though state court would not).
58. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082,
1098-99 (1963); Storke, Conflicts Erie Cases, 32 RocKY MT. L. REv. 20, 36 (1959);
\Testal, snpra note 49.
59. But see Vestal, supra note 49, at 269.
237
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III. "COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS": THE KEY TO USE OF STATE
CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES IN FEDERAL COURTS
Conceding the weakness of Byrd as a reed upon which to rest an
argument for general and pervasive change in the outcome-determinative
rule, it is nevertheless the basic thesis of this article that Byrd's "counter-
vailing considerations" concept is useful, indeed essential, for achieving
wise and desirable answers to the question of when, in choosing applic-
able state law, a federal court should utilize the conflict of laws rules of
the state in which it sits. The Byrd rationale has very special strengths
here which it may not have elsewhere.
Neither of the two basic reasons given by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Erie for overruling Swift v. Tyson, the constitutional dictum or the in-
terpretation of "laws" to include decisional law, is applicable to use of
state conflicts rules. There has been much debate concerning the sound-
ness of the dictum concerning the "unconstitutionality of the course pur-
sued"6 under Tyson. Mr. Justice Brandeis' reasoning here seems to have
been that Congress could not constitutionally make laws applicable to es-
sentially intrastate transactions, when unauthorized by any provision of
the Constitution of the United States. If Congress could not do this,
neither could the federal courts: "Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local
in their nature, or 'general,' be they commercial law or part of the law
of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts."'" This argument, which might con-
veniently be labelled a "tenth amendment"6 2 argument, 3 also appeared in
several of the pre-Erie dissents to applications of Tyson." A possible re-
ply to this constitutional argument is that, although Congress cannot leg-
islate except within the bounds of its constitutional authority, the "neces-
sary and proper" clause' combined with the judiciary article 0 may in
fact be sufficient constitutional authority for Congress to make substan-
60. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
61. Id. at 78.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."
63. See Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nora.,
Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960); Silving, Analogies Extending and Restricting
Federal Jurisdiction; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkinr and the Law of Conflict, 31 IowA L.
Ray. 330, 345 (1946).
64. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-33 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 399 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
65. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
66. U.S. CoNsT. art. III.
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tive law for diversity cases."7 Even conceding the validity of this consti-
tutional argument, however,"8 it is not applicable to conflict of laws rules
involving by definition, interstate rather than intrastate transactions, and
subject to congressional control under the commerce 9 and full faith and
credit 0 clauses. Mr. Justice Brandeis was addressing himself solely to
application of an alien rule to an essentially intrastate transaction which,
under the Constitution, was solely of state concern. It was surely only
in this limited context that he meant "there is no federal general common
law."'" In a case decided the same day as Erie, Mr. Justice Brandeis
himself applied what he called "federal common law" in deciding another
case involving the apportionment of an interstate stream." Moreover,
Erie itself involved a choice-of-law problem. The impact had been in
Pennsylvania while the federal forum was in New York. Without pay-
ing the New York choice-of-law rule even the respect of mention, the case
was remanded to permit the circuit court to determine and apply the
Pennsylvania tort law." This is especially striking in view of the fact
that the question of the applicability of Erie to choice-of-law rules was
specifically reserved in a case decided less than a month after Erie and
sub judice at the time Erie was decided. 4
Another, possibly stronger, argument in support of a constitutional
basis for Erie is that, although Congress has constitutional power to make
substantive law for diversity cases, the federal courts, on their own, do
67. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). But
see Quigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1031, 1059
(1962) ; Whicher, supra note 54, at 553.
68. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (con-
struing United States Arbitration Act as not applicable, to avoid constitutional question
presented by Erie).
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Silving, supra note 63, at 351.
70. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. See Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE LJ. 421 (1919); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and
the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1229-30 (1946).
71. 304 U.S. at 78.
72. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)
(government's right to recover for injury to soldier governed by federal law even
though Congress has not acted on the question) ; National Metropolitan Bank v. United
States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945) (even in absence of statute, rights and liabilities on com-
mercial paper issued by the federal government determined by federal law) ; Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (same) ; Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 197 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1952) (same).
73. 304 U.S. at 80. For similar pre-Klaxon statements see Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1941) ; Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397 (1938). That, because
of echoes of Tyson in New York opinions, reference to New York law might have
produced a different result, see Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw.
U.L. REv. 427, 541, 598 (1958).
74. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208 n. 2 (1938).
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not, 5 save in those few areas where the necessity for a uniform national
result achieved by adherence to a federal rule requires the shaping of "fed-
eral common law."76  Again, even assuming that conflict rules do not
present such a need for national uniformity, this reason is not applicable
to such rules. That a forum uses its own conflicts rules is a doctrine too
firmly established to provide any room for such a constitutional argument.
Finally, and best of all, a constitutional argument for Erie can be
made by analogy to those cases establishing due process limitations on a
state's choice of law." A forum may not apply its own law to a case so
as to affect the result on the merits, unless some policy of the forum
would be advanced in so doing and its application would not outrageously
surprise one of the parties." Once again, such a constitutional argument
is not applicable to choice-of-law rules if those rules point to a domestic
law, the application of which meets the requirements of due process.
As for Erie's interpretation of "laws" as including court-made law-
this does not foreclose the argument, especially in view of Mr. Justice
Brandeis' failure to advert to the conflicts element in Erie, that such
court-made laws include only the ordinary domestic laws of the appro-
priate state, not the conflicts rules of the state in which the district court
is sitting. This contention is buttressed by the last phrase in the Judiciary
Act section under scrutiny-"in cases where they apply." The federal
court, the argument might run, is free to decide for itself to which con-
troversies, having contacts with more than one state, the domestic law of
any particular state is applicable.
Having said all this, however, is still not to say that a federal dis-
trict court should never apply the conflicts rules of the state in which it is
sitting. The outcome-determinative gloss written upon Erie in subsequent
Supreme Court cases had no real relation to Erie itself,)7 but that gloss
nevertheless represents a policy which, if unopposed by "countervailing
considerations," should prevail-the policy against making the result de-
pend upon the fortuitous selection of forum." Different conflicts rules
are likely to lead to different results in litigation as surely as different
substantive domestic laws. The following sections, then, will be devoted
75. See Quigley, supra note 67; Whicher, supra note 54, at 551; Note, 52 H.LRv.
L. REv. 1002, 1003 (1939).
76. See cases cited note 72 supra.
77. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
78. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a
State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449, 490 (1959).
79. See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 633-34.
80. "If the decree would have been right in a court of the State of Texas it was
right in a District Court of the United States sitting in the same State." Union Trust
Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 418 (1918) (Holmes, J.)
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to examining various circumstances in which a federal district court, in a
diversity case, might be asked to apply the conflicts rules of the state in
which it is sitting. The purpose will be to determine in what situations
the non-constitutional, non-statutory policy against forum-shopping be-
tween state and federal court is outweighed by other, conflicting policies,
pointing to the federal court's applying its own conflicts rules.
IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE APPLICATION OF ERIE TO ANY
CONFLICTS PROBLEM
A. The Danger of Interstate Forum-Shopping
It might be argued that the policy against intrastate forum-shopping
is always outweighed by the danger of interstate forum-shopping if a
federal district court is required to conform to local state conflicts law.
Application of the local conflicts rule will reflect the parochial views of
the forum state and provide a convenient forum, additional to the state
court, where, by application of inappropriate and outcome-determinative
forum rules, the result is made dependent upon the selection of the forum.
Classic examples of this undesirable practice are Sampson v. ChannelP'
and the landmark Supreme Court case extending Erie to conflicts rules,
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.1 2 In each of these cases, the federal
court was required to apply an outcome-determinative rule of the state in
which it was sitting if that state would classify the rule as "procedural."
This was true even though the forum state would agree that all "sub-
stantive" issues should be decided under the law of another jurisdiction
whose contacts with facts and parties made use of its law more appropri-
ate. In Sampson this resulted in applying the Massachusetts rule on bur-
den of proof as to contributory negligence when, for resolution of all
"substantive" issues, a Massachusetts court would have looked to Maine
law. In Klaxon, such a view required remand to determine whether a
Delaware court would insist on applying the Delaware rule on judgment
interest to a contract made and performed in New York, the only contact
with Delaware being that Delaware was the place of the defendant's
incorporation.8
There are several possible answers to such an argument. First of
all, as Professor Freund has pointed out," the "additional convenient
81. 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
82. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
83. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 685 (1942) (deciding Delaware would regard the New York rule as "sub-
stantive" and apply it).
84. Freund, Federal-State Relations in the Opinions of Judge Magruder, 72
HARV. L. Rxv. 1204, 1212 (1959).
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forum" argument may be based on an assumption as to the plaintiff's
freedom of choice of forum which is unrealistic in view of the fact that
in most diversity cases the action may be brought "only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.""5  But passing this
hurdle, the fact remains that the choice-of-law rules of a state are im-
portant expressions of its domestic policy."0 It is as important for the
state to decide to what interstate transactions is domesic laws are ap-
plicable as it is for it to decide what intrastate transactions invoke those
laws." Displacement of a state conflicts rule by the federal court's own
view as to appropriate choice of law, although it may be proper under
certain circumstances, should not be made cavalierly or as a matter of
course. Moreover, although labelling as "procedural" a rule with high
potential for affecting the outcome may seem a wild and irrational aber-
ration of the local state's conflicts doctrine, it may mask a poorly articu-
lated but quite reasonable policy decision that in fact the local domestic
rule is the one most appropriate for application to the interstate transac-
tion in dispute. A notorious example of this is the dictum in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc."8 that the $15,000 limit on recovery contained in
the Massachusetts wrongful death act was not applicable to a suit in New
York by the administrator of a deceased New York domiciliary who had
boarded the fatal airplane flight in New York, because the measure of
damages was "procedural."
At bottom, the argument that federal courts should always apply
their own conflict rules assumes that federal courts, being by nature less
parochial than the courts of the state in which they are sitting, will be
far more likely to evolve better choice-of-law rules, selecting domestic
rules more appropriate than those that would be selected by a local state
court.8 9 This assumption may have been rendered obsolete by the many
recent indications that state courts are turning from rigid, territorially-
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958). This choice is now enlarged in a number of
cases by the 1963 amendment to the venue provision providing that "A Civil action on
a tort claim arising out of the manufacture, assembly, repair, ownership, maintenance,
use, or operation of an automobile may be brought in the judicial district wherein the
act or omission complained of occurred." 77 Stat. 473 (1963).
86. See Cavers, Change in, Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon
Problem, in ALl STUDY OF THE DivISlON oF JuRIsDIcTioN BErWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 154, 166 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY] ; Currie,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Ca. L. Rxv. 341,
344 (1960).
87. See Freund, supra note 70, at 1217-19.
88. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (1961).
89. See Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era, 94 U.
PA. L. REv. 293, 295 (1946). But see Cavers, supra note 86, at 182-91 (reasons why
unlikely federal courts could develop a unitary system of choice-of-law rules better
than states have done).
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oriented choice-of-law rules to choice of law based upon analysis of the
policies underlying putatively conflicting domestic rules."0
In extreme cases where, in any view, the state conflicts rule results
in an irrational selection of inappropriate law, a remedy may lie in cau-
tious extension of established constitutional limitations on a state's choice
of law. One area where such extension might occur is that mentioned
above. It should be a violation of due process for a forum, by the device
of affixing a "procedural" label, to avoid the application of another
state's rule, if the policies underlying the other state's rule would be ad-
vanced by applying that rule to the case at bar, the rule is of a kind which
has high potential for affecting the outcome on the merits, the foreign
rule is not inordinately difficult for the forum to find and apply and
application of the forum's different rule will not advance any rationally
applicable policy of the forum. Ironically, one of the first candidates for
overruling under such a view of due process would be Klaxon itself.91  A
similar due process argument might be made if the forum state would
apply its own "substantive" law to a controversy as indicated by a tra-
ditional, territorially-oriented choice-of-law rule, such as the place of
impact for torts, but analysis reveals that no policy of the forum's rule
is applicable to the case at bar and that a different and rationally ap-
plicable rule exists elsewhere.
Again, if the forum would refuse to apply its own rule because the
forum's traditional choice-of-law rule points to some other geographical
location as having the decisive "contact," such a refusal may be based
upon an unreasonable classification if in fact the policies underlying the
forum rule would be advanced by applying it and if application would not
interfere with the legitimate interests of any other state or unfairly sur-
prise any party. Such unreasonableness should be precluded by the
"equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution."
90. Seee.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 8 Cal. Rptr. 386(1961); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957);
Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) ; Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7
Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
91. See Cavers, supra note 86, at 210; Weintraub, supra note 78, at 467-68.
92. See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutionul Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1960); Kramer, Interests and Policy
Clashes in Conflict of Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 523, 536 (1959); Weintraub, A
Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 224-25 (1963);
ef. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 559 (1920) (borrowing statute's exclu-
sion of local citizen not "arbitrary or vexatious discrimination against non-residents") ;
Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344
(1949).
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B. The Danger of Intrastate Forum-Shopping
Paradoxically, requiring the federal district court to apply the con-
flicts law of the state in which it is sitting may result in the very intra-
state forum-shopping which such a requirement is designed to prevent.
This is because the conflicts area is in a state of flux approaching revo-
lution. Choice-of-law rules formerly accepted without question are being
rapidly displaced and long lines of cases based on such rules overturned. 3
In such an atmosphere, a party who would benefit from application of
a standard, territorially-oriented choice-of-law rule reflected in the most
recent pronouncement of the highest court of the state would do well to
choose the federal district court as forum. Conversely, a party will have
far greater chance of success in the state supreme court, if he wishes to
argue that the conflicts rule formerly accepted in the state would produce
an irrational and unjust result in the case and should be changed in accord
with current trends elsewhere.94 It is sobering to reflect that only five
years before Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc."9 and seven years before
Babcock v. Jackson96 so able a federal judge as Jerome Frank felt com-
pelled, despite his sympathy with arguments that the result was unjust, to
sanction the dismissal of a complaint brought by an American plaintiff
against an American defendant in an American court if the plaintiff
could not prove the tort law of Saudi Arabia, the place of injury. New
York had consistently applied the law of the place of wrong to tort con-
flicts problems and Judge Frank could "see no signs that the New York
decisions pertinent here are obsolescent."97
The reason for this unhappy state of affairs is that federal courts
have been given too little freedom to adapt to current trends in state law.
In the words of Mr. Justice Black:
But the Circuit Courts of Appeals do not have the same power
to reconsider interpretations of state law by state courts as do
the highest courts of the state in which a decision has been ren-
dered. The Mississippi Supreme Court had the power to re-
consider and overrule its former interpretation, but the court
below did not. And in the absence of a change by the Missis-
93. See cases cited note 90 supra.
94. See IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3324 (2d ed. 1961); Quigley, supra note
67, at 1036.
95. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
96. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
97. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956). Although Judge Frank wrote the opinion which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint, he voted to remand in order to give the plaintiff another
opportunity to prove Saudi-Arabian law.
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sippi legislature, the court below could reconsider and depart
from the ruling of the highest court of Mississippi on Missis-
sippi's statute of limitations only to the extent, if any, that ex-
amination of the later opinions of the Mississippi Supreme
Court showed that it had changed its earlier interpretation of
the effect of the Mississippi statute."5
Unless "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the
state would otherwise decide," the federal court is required to follow the
opinions, not only of the state supreme court, but the lower state courts
of record." In what may be the crowning indignity, even on questions
in which it is clear that the state court would apply the law of another
state, the federal court must ascertain the law of that other state, not in-
dependently, but as the alter ego of the supreme court of the state in
which it is sitting."' 0 As Judge Friendly has said, "the question is not
what we think but what we think the New York Court of Appeals would
think the Supreme Court of Ohio would think."'' To aggravate the
situation, in diversity cases the Supreme Court has, except in exceptional
circumstances like avoidance of a constitutional issue, disapproved a fed-
eral court's staying proceedings until a doubtful question of state law
could be determined by the parties in a declaratory proceeding in a state
court.' It is not surprising, then, to find federal judges saying such
things as: "Nor can we apply, in diversity cases, a rule of stare decisis
which permits us to weight the degree of authority belonging to a prece-
dent by its agreement with the spirit of the times. The Georgia courts
can overrule their prior decisions. The Federal Courts cannot do so."1'3
If the question is how to avoid this weird form of intrastate forum-
shopping, the answer does not lie in giving federal courts complete free-
dom to disregard the law of the state in which they are sitting. The
answer does lie in removal of artificial limitations which have impeded
their efforts to reflect viable current trends and changes in conflicts law
not discernible in state opinions which are ripe for overruling. Professor
98. Moore v. Illinois C. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 633 (1941).
99. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). See also
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940) ; cf. King v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948) (need not follow decision of
court not of record and not constituting precedent in any state court).
100. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
101. Cooke v. E. F. Drew & Co., 319 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissent).
102. Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228 (1943) ; Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) (avoidance
of constitutional question-suit to enjoin enforcement of state tax).
103. Polk County, Ga. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir.
1959). See also Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., 310 F.2d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Haus-
man v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 704 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Moore has put it well: "Although there must be faithful adherence to
state substantive law in non-federal matters, it should be a wise and dis-
cerning loyalty, something in the nature of a 'prophetic judgment' as to
what the highest court would now do."'" 4  In an area which is changing
as rapidly as is the conflict of laws, there should be a reversal of the cur-
rent attitude which prevents federal courts from obtaining direct infor-
mation on the state view of the matter in controversy by staying, for
declaratory proceedings in a state court, or, where state statute permits,'*5
certifying the question directly to the state court.
C. The Loss of Federal Judicial Talent in Developing Conflict Rules
It might be urged that requiring federal courts in diversity cases to
follow the law of the state in which they are sitting destroys the creativity
of federal courts in a major fraction of their business and squanders the
talents of federal judges, whose ranks include many of our most able
jurists.' This is an especially serious waste of intellectual resources in
an area, such as conflicts, where the complexity of the problems and the
rapidity of current growth and change require as much talent as can be
recruited.
Much of the answer to such an argument lies in what has been said
just above concerning the desirability of giving federal judges in diversity
cases reasonable freedom to take account of developing trends so that
they do not march several leagues behind the very state courts whose pace
they are attempting to match. But there is another vast area where full
advantage may be taken of the creative talents of federal judges in solv-
ing conflicts problems. This is the area in which, in the interstitial aug-
menting of federal common or statutory law, the federal court turns to
state law as the rule for decision.' 7 The federal court should be free here
to determine for itself which state will supply the rule most appropriate
104. MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 338 (1949).
See also Cooke v. E. F. Drew & Co., 319 F.2d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) ; Cavers, supra note 86, at 211; Quigley, mipra note 67, at 1067.
105. See FLA. STATS. ANN., §§ 25.031-.032 (1961), utilized in Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) to avoid decision of constitutional question; cf.
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diver-
sity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 214 (1957) (federal certification statute would be pos-
sible).
106. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
489, 510 (1954); Corbin, The Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J.
195, 200 (1961); Note, 71 YALE L.J. 344, 353 (1961).
107. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958) (indicating commis-
sioner's recover of estate's tax deficiencies from beneficiary of life insurance policy
held by decedent depends upon law of decedent's domicile); Helvering v. Fuller, 310
U.S. 69 (1940) (whether husband taxable on income from alimony trust depends on
whether, under appropriate state law, the husband can be compelled to make additional
payments in the future).
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for the case at bar.' In cases involving injury to passengers on the high
seas, but on the law side of the federal court solely by reason of diversity
jurisdiction," 9 federal courts have employed their own conflicts rules in
determining which nation's law should govern the validity of contractual
shortening of periods of limitations."' The Supreme Court has left open
the question of whether Klaxon is applicable to cases in which federal
jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship."' This doubt should
be resolved in favor of freedom for federal judges to lend their talents
to the new efforts to solve conflicts problems in a more rational and just
manner. Intrastate forum-shopping between state and federal court would
not result, because once the federal choice-of-law rule had been estab-
lished, the state court, having concurrent jurisdiction of the issue arising
under federal law, would be compelled to follow suit."2
There might, of course, be a period of time, perhaps a substantial
period, which would pass before the federal conflicts rules were authori-
tatively established and in which intrastate forum-shopping might occur.
For this reason, the ideal situation in which to develop federal choice-of-
law rules is that in which federal law looks to state law for the final rule
of decision, but jurisdiction is exclusively in the federal courts. Suits
against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act"' fit
this description exactly. Unfortunately, this chance for creative federal
contributions to the common law of conflicts has thus far been wasted
because the statute expresses a woodenly rigid choice-of-law rule refer-
ring to "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.""' 4 In
order to restore at least a chance for flexibility and rationality to the
statutory rule, the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted it
as referring to the whole law of the state where the "act or omission
occurred" including that state's choice-of-law rule."' It would be better
to amend the statute so as to leave federal courts free to fashion their own
108. See Freund, supra note 70, at 1236 n.62; Mishkin, The Variomess of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 807-08 (1957).
109. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (no
jurisdiction over maritime claims on law side of federal court unless there is diversity
of citizenship).
110. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Piscane
v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
111. D'oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 456
(1942). See also Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1955) (indicating
federal and state choice-of-law rule would be the same in an action by trustee in
bankruptcy for federal tax refund).
112. Cf. Siegelmnan v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
113. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1958).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
115. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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conflicts rules in tort claim cases. This might be done, for example, by
having the quoted provision read simply "the appropriate law."
A possible rebuttal to this position is that, once it is determined that
state law should be looked to for the rule of decision, the whole law of the
state should be applied, including its conflicts rules." 6  Conflicts rules
express the policies of the state as surely as the purely domestic rules of
the state and often provide a vital clue to the policies underlying the
domestic rules. This is true. Saying that federal courts, in federal
question cases where reference to state law is required, should be free to
fashion their own conflicts rules is, however, not saying that they should
deliberately disregard state conflicts rules. They should examine the
state conflicts rules for any clue those state rules afford as to the policies
underlying the putatively conflicting state domestic rules. Any rational
choice-of-law decision must begin with a consideration of those underly-
ing policies. Also, any proper choice-of-law rule will avoid unfair sur-
prise to the parties. If a federal court decides to fashion a conflicts rule
different from that of the state in which it is sitting, it will be because the
court's rule is thought to be more "appropriate"-more concerned with
the policies underlying the conflicting domestic rules of the states having
relevant contacts with the controversy and less likely to upset the reason-
able expectations of the parties.
D. Across-the-Board Refusal to Apply State Conflicts Rules Unjustified
For the reasons stated above, a blunderbuss attack on federal courts
ever applying state conflicts rules should be repulsed. It cannot be said
that there is any one policy or any combination of policies which, in all
circumstances, will outweigh the policy against intrastate forum-shopping
which urges a federal court to use the conflicts rules of the state in which
it is sitting. What is required is separate scrutiny of various diversity
jurisdiction cases to determine in which circumstances the policy aganst
intrastate forum-shopping is overcome by countervailing considerations.
Now to turn to this task.
V. STATE FORUwi-CLOSING CONFLICTS RULES
A. General Diversity Jurisdiction
Out of the rather complex circumstances in Angel v. Bullingtonie
arose the rule that, in a diversity case, a federal court must follow the
conflicts rule of the state in which it is sitting, even if that state rule
merely closes the state forum to suit and does not produce a result on the
116. See 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 3056, 3769-70 (2d ed. 1961).
117. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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merits. In Angel, the plaintiff, a citizen of Virginia, had sold land in
Virginia to the defendant, a North Carolina citizen. The defendant
made a down payment and then defaulted on one of a series of notes
given for the balance of the purchase price. The land was sold under a
power of sale contained in a deed of trust securing the notes. Because
the proceeds of sale were less than the amount owed on the notes, the
plaintiff brought suit in a state court in North Carolina for the deficiency.
The defendant demurred, relying on a North Carolina statute which pro-
vided that "In all sales of real property by . . . trustees under powers of
sale contained in any . . . deed of trust . . . the . . . holder of the
notes secured by such . . . deed of trust shall not be entitled to a de-
ficiency judgment .... ""' The trial court overruled the demurrer, but
on appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the statute denied
the state courts jurisdiction to grant the relief sought and dismissed the
suit. The North Carolina high court, stating that it was merely denying
a forum and not passing on any question of substantive law that affected
the merits, rejected the plaintiff's claim under the United States Consti-
tution that North Carolina was precluded from closing the doors of its
courts to him. Without appealing this decision to the Supreme Court of
the United States, the plaintiff, utilizing diversity jurisdiction, brought
a new suit for the deficiency judgment in a federal district court sitting
in North Carolina. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the court
of appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the
issue of whether North Carolina could constitutionally close its courts to
plaintiff was res judicata, having been decided adversely to the plaintiff
in the North Carolina high court opinion which plaintiff had allowed to
become final. If North Carolina state courts were not open to the plain-
tiff, then, to avoid a difference in result, a federal district court sitting
in North Carolina was similarly closed to him.
In opposing Angel and urging that a federal court in a diversity case
should not be bound by any forum-closing state rule, several arguments
might be based upon the current wording of section thirty-four of the
Judiciary Act of 1789." ' State forum-closing rules are not "rules of
decision" because they do not produce a judgment on the merits. More-
over, the Judicial Code, in stating that "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction"'20 of diversity cases, does "otherwise require or provide."
The real issues, however, run deeper than such surface arguments
suggest. Very important state policies designed for the protection of
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1950).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1958).
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citizens of the state may be expressed in terms of forum-closing rules.
If a state has an applicable rule insulating its citizen from liability flow-
ing from a transaction having some contacts abroad, it might be more
desirable for the state to resolve any conflict between the policies under-
lying its rule and the policies underlying the applicable liability-producing
rule of another state and come to a decision on the merits, applying one
rule or the other. By abandoning the ostrich-like solution of simply clos-
ing its courts to the problem, the chances are increased that conflicts in-
volving commercial agreements will be resolved in favor of validity, espe-
cially if the difference in domestic rules producing the conflict reflects a
difference in detail rather than basic policy.'' The fact remains, how-
ever, that states do utilize the forum-closing device to express their
strongly held policies. Moreover, although theoretically not a decision on
the merits, closing of the local forum may effectively insulate the local
citizen from liability, for the plaintiff may not be able to find a court else-
where which has jurisdiction to render a judgment against the defendant
or to affect his rights in property.
In the typical diversity case, a federal district court should respect
the policies underlying the forum-closing rules of the state in which it is
sitting unless these policies are those of the state only qua possible forum
and do not rationally flow from some contact which the state has with
the parties or with the transaction. Typical of rationally applicable rules
which should be respected is that of protecting a local citizen from con-
tractual liability entered into abroad, when the interest of his domicile in
protecting him was at all times apparent.'22 Another such rule is that of
insulating a citizen of the state from tort liability to another local citizen
when, although the injury fortuitously happened abroad, the policies
underlying the rule denying liability remain fully applicable. 23  State
forum-closing rules which are rationally applicable only when trial is held
in the state, should not be followed when the forum is shifted to a federal
court sitting in the state. Forum non conveniens is one such solely forum-
centered policy. 4 Perhaps another would be a rule designed to keep of-
121. See Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws-A Critique, 46 Iowa L. Rxv. 713, 714-18 (1961).
122. See Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
123. See, e.g., Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Koplik
v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958) ; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3
N.E.2d 597 (1936); Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23, cert. denied, 293 U.S.
597 (1934).
124. See Hill, supra note 73, at 570-71; cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947) (question of application of Erie left open). Contra, Weiss v. Routh, 149
F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.) (Erie applicable).
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fensive testimony from being heard in state courts.'25
In short, the argument that a state forum-closing rule is, in view of
the policies it advances, applicable only in the state courts qua possible
forums and is inapplicable in another forum, even a federal court sitting
in the state, deserves serious consideration when made. Angel v. Bulling-
ton rejected the argument that the North Carolina statute, as construed by
the North Carolina Supreme Court, was intended only to close the courts
of that state and not federal courts sitting there. Angel characterized as
"obsolete""' David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America,2 '
which had accepted such an argument and had held that a corporation,
which could not sue in New York state courts because it was not author-
ized to do business in New York, could maintain a suit in a federal court
in that state. In view of North Carolina's strong interest in protecting
its citizens from a deficiency judgment, this argument may have been
properly rejected in Angel. Its rejection is more debatable in Woods v.
Interstate Reality Co."8 which reached a result opposite that of David
Lupton's Sons under a similar state statute. It should not be assumed
that there is never any merit to the argument that a state's forum-closing
rule is rationally applicable only in courts of that state.
The argument based on the Judiciary Act provision "except where
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide" is weakest when it claims that the general provision
for diversity jurisdiction is license to override a strong and rationally
applicable state policy when that policy is expressed in a forum-closing
conflicts rule, rather than one which points to the law of the state for a
judgment on the merits. Such an argument gains strength, however, in
cases like Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski,"9 where relief under the federal
Declaratory Judgments Act " was denied because a Wisconsin court
would not let an insurance company, subject to direct suit in Wisconsin,
obtain a preliminary declaration of its policy's coverage."' The argu-
ment becomes compelling in situations where a state attempts to restrict
certain proceedings to the state courts of general jurisdiction, withdraw-
125. Cf. Gordon v Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 43 (D. Mass.), affd, 178 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1949).
126. 330 U.S. at 192.
127. 225 U.S. 489 (1912).
128. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
129. 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960).
130. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958).
131. But see Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 360 (1961) (dictum).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ing jurisdiction from all other courts, including federal courts within the
state.132
B. Constitutional Limitations on Forum-Closing
A state's forum-closing rule should withstand constitutional attack
under the due process clause if the policy underlying the rule would be
advanced by applying it to the case at bar, and if its application will not
outrageously surprise the plaintiff.' Such a test is usually satisfied if
the state seeks to protect its citizens from liability on agreements made in
other states, which would be unenforceable if entered into within the state.
Unless the defendant's domicile has changed since the transaction in
issue, an outrageous surprise argument would be difficult for the plain-
tiff to maintain.
A state's forum-closing rule should be immune from attack under
the full faith and credit clause unless the state's interest in the application
of that rule is outweighed by the national need for a uniform result under
the public act, record or judicial proceeding of another state. 4 In the
area of judgments, where the national full faith and credit policy is espe-
cially strong, local forum-closing rules will generally have to bow to per-
mit enforcement of the judgment of a sister state.' It is only in excep-
tional circumstances, if any, however, in which a state's rationally ap-
plicable forum-closing rule should have to yield to permit suit on a statti-
tory or non-statutory cause of action arising under the law of another
state and not reduced to judgment. Hughes v. Fetter'36 did hold that
Wisconsin could not close its courts to a suit under the Illinois wrongful
death act.' This holding, however, was based on a finding that Wis-
consin had no interest whatever to weigh in the balance against the need
to give full faith and credit to the Illinois statute by providing a forum
for the action. Wisconsin had no policy against wrongful death actions
generally because suit could be brought there for a death caused in Wis-
consin. Wisconsin had no valid forum non conveniens policy here ap-
plicable because all the parties were Wisconsin residents. Even in Hughes
v. Fetter, however, this conclusion is debatable. A rational forum non
conveniens policy may be based not only upon foreign parties, but upon
132. See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961); ef.
Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
133. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a
State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449, 490 (1959).
134. Id. at 490-91.
135. See Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). But see Anglo-American Pro-
vision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
136. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
137. Accord, First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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foreign facts, the need for calling foreign witnesses and the problems in-
volved in applying foreign law. The rationale of Hughes v. Fetter should
not be applicable to situations in which a state's forum-closing rule ad-
vances a policy of the state, and surely not if a state has such an interest
in the matter that a judgment on the merits for the defendant would
withstand constitutional attack, but the state elects instead to close its
courts to the plaintiff.
C. State Forum-Closing Rules in Federal Interpleader Actions
Griffin v. McCoacW38 was the landmark case discussing the inter-
play between the Federal Interpleader Acte3 9 and the outcome-determina-
tive Erie gloss. Colonel Robert D. Gordon, a citizen of Texas, interested
several persons in Texas oil developments and a syndicate was formed for
this purpose. Money was advanced to Gordon by the syndicate and pre-
miums paid on an insurance policy on his life. Gordon promised to re-
pay the syndicate, but in fact, no repayment was ever made. Because of
financial reverses, the syndicate was dissolved and a new association
formed for the sole purpose of paying premiums on the life insurance
policy and receiving and distributing the proceeds among the members,
one-eighth to Gordon's widow and seven-eighths to members of the syn-
dicate or their assignees. The application for the insurance policy was
signed by Gordon in New York and accepted in New Jersey at the home
office of the insurer; the policy was delivered in New York. The final
change of beneficiaries incorporating the agreement to divide the pro-
ceeds eight ways was effected by forms signed in Texas by Gordon and
in New York by other beneficiaries, the insurer's endorsement on the
policy in New Jersey, and return of the policy to the New York bene-
ficiaries. Upon Gordon's death, his personal representatives sued the
insurer on the policy in a federal district court in Texas. The insurer,
moving under the Federal Interpleader Act, impleaded the other bene-
ficiaries who claimed a seven-eighths share in the proceeds. The Federal
Interpleader Act permits a stakeholder, such as the insurer here, if there
are two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship, to bring a bill
of interpleader in any judicial district in which a claimant resides. Service
of process under the act is nation-wide. The district court distributed the
proceeds of the policy, one-eighth to Gordon's widow and the remainder
to the other beneficiaries, as indicated in the policy. The estate's repre-
sentatives appealed, contending that under Texas law the claimants ad-
verse to the widow did not have an insurable interest in Gordon's life.
138. 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the policy and subsequent
changes were governed by New York law, under which the policy's terms
concerning distribution were enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded to the court of appeals for determination of Texas law.
The implication was that the federal court should do whatever a Texas
court would do under the same circumstances.
In fact, however, a Texas court would never have a case under the
same circumstances. Because of the diverse citizenship of the claimants,
the insurer could not file an effective bill of interpleader in a Texas state
court. The case that might occur in a Texas state court would be a suit
by the New York beneficiaries against Gordon's estate to recover seven-
eighths of the policy proceeds. Even this is very unlikely, however, as
the wisest course for the New York beneficiaries to follow would be to
stay out of Texas and sue the insurer in New York.
Assuming, however, a suit in a Texas court involving the New
York beneficiaries against the estate, there are two possible courses of
action for a Texas court to take in enforcing the Texas rule on insurable
interest: to close the Texas forum to the suit and dismiss but not on the
merits, or to render judgment on merits for the estate. The federal
court in the interpleader action would have no difficulty mirroring the
Texas judgment on the merits for the estate, although such a result would
raise grave questions which are discussed in the next section of this article.
What, though, is the federal court to do in its interpleader action if
the Texas courts would simply close their doors and not render a decision
on the merits? One possibility is to deliver the proceeds to the represen-
tative of the estate, leaving the adverse claimants theoretically free to pur-
sue the proceeds in the hands of the representative, but cutting off any
claim that the New York beneficiaries might have had against the insurer.
Though nominally not a decision on the merits, such a decision would, for
all practical purposes, end the New York beneficiaries' chances of obtain-
ing the proceeds, since a Texas state forum would be closed to them and
their rights against the insurer would be terminated. This raises ques-
tions substantially identical with the propriety of the federal court, in an
interpleader action, mirroring a Texas judgment on the merits. This is
discussed in the next section. In fact, on remand, the circuit court
awarded the proceeds to Gordon's administrator, but it is not clear
whether the New York beneficiaries would be free to pursue the proceeds
in his hands, if they could find some way to do so.14
140. Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 683
(1942).
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Another possibility, if the Texas rule is a forum-closing one, is to
dismiss the bill of interpleader and return the funds to the stakeholder.
This should not be the result. Federal interpleader is one circumstance
under which the federal forum should not be closed in deference to a
state forum-closing rule. Because of the nation-wide service of process
available under the Federal Interpleader Act, upon dismissal, the stake-
holder could simply bring suit again in another judicial district where a
claimant resided, obtain in personam jurisdiction over all claimants, and
enjoin pending.. or future action against it in a state court. It should
not be necessary to act out such a ridiculous charade. In view of the
futility of attempting to follow a state forum-closing rule by dismissing
a bill of interpleader, the argument that the Federal Interpleader Act does
"otherwise require or provide" is particularly strong.
VI. APPLICATION OF STATE LAW ON THE MERITS WHEN THE FEDERAL
COURT HAS NATION-WIDE JURISDICTION
A. Izterpleader Actio;zs
Griffin v. McCoaclh also raises the question of whether a federal
court, in an interpleader case, having nation-wide service of process,
should invariably apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it is
sitting, thus selecting the law to govern the merits. It has been urged
that the federal court should not do so because this would make federal
interpleader a device for interstate forum-shopping. The first claimant
to sue could fix the forum and pick the law.'42
This is not quite true. Only the stakeholder may bring a bill in
federal interpleader.' 4 The bill may be brought in any judicial district
where a claimant resides.' The federal court within which the bill is
brought has jurisdiction to enjoin claimants anywhere in the nation45
from instituting or continuing 4 . actions in state courts against the stake-
holder. The stakeholder, being required to deposit in court the funds or
141. See Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 577 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
sub now., Fleming v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 358 U.S. 879 (1958) (prior state court suit
enjoinable).
142. See, e.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Ovini-
presence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE LJ. 267, 287 (1946) ; Harper, Policy Bases of
the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Re-reading Professor Lorensen's Essays, 56
YALE L.J. 1155, 1175 n.63 (1947).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1958).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).
146. See Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 577 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
sub non:., Fleming v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 358 U.S. 879 (1958) (prior state court suit
enjoinable).
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property it is holding14 7 to be divided among the claimants, will usually
have no incentive for interstate forum-shopping, except, perhaps, on mat-
ters unrelated to the merits, such as whether the stakeholder may recover
its attorneys' fees.148
Nevertheless, there remains compelling force to the argument that, in
federal interpleader, the federal court should not be required to apply the
choice-of-law rules of the state in which it is sitting. Although, theoretic-
ally, the stakeholder may sue anywhere a claimant resides, it is likely that
the bill of interpleader will be filed as a reflex action in the judicial dis-
trict in which the first claimant sues the stakeholder. This is what hap-
pened in Griffin v. McCoach. Moreover, the power of nation-wide serv-
ice of process obligates the federal court to act as a neutral forum, not as
the vassal of the state in which it is sitting.'49 Otherwise the policies of
that state might prevail over claimants who, but for the nation-wide serv-
ice, could never have been subjeced to those policies. A similar action
could not be brought in a state court. Indeed, this is the reason we have
federal interpleader. Therefore, it is false and misleading, in this con-
text, to talk of the danger of intrastate forum-shopping if the federal
court refuses to apply the conflicts rules of the state in which it is sitting.
It is not suggested that in federal interpleader the federal court de-
liberately ignore the conflicts rules of the state in which it is sitting, but
merely that the court be free to depart from those rules if it sees fit to do
so. Under such a standard, the federal court would reject the law of the
state in which it is sitting should it decide that the law of another state
is more appropriately applicable. In making this determination, the fed-
eral court should consider the policies underlying the relevant conflicting
dometsic laws, including clues to such policies as may be provided by the
conflicts rules of the states involved. Any true conflict between the
domestic law of the state in which the federal court is sitting and the
domestic law of another state should be resolved against the law of the
local state if, as in Griffin v. McCoach, it is an odd, anachronistic lag in
the development of local law, unknown in other states."'
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1958).
148. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 206 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. III. 1962)
(whether stakeholder entitled to attorneys' fees out of fund depends on local state law).
Contra, Palomas Land & Cattle Co. v. Baldwin, 189 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1951).
149. See AL STUDY 35 (recommending that 28 U.S.C. § 2361 be amended so that
when state law supplies the rule of decision, the district court may make its own
determination as to which state rule is applicable); Freund, Federal-State Relations in
the Opinions of Judge Magruder, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1204, 1211 (1959).
150. See Clark, supra note 142, at 287 (Texas rule was "unique").
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B. Other Proceedings
If, when the action is brought by a usually neutral stakeholder, a
federal court, whose process runs beyond the state in which it sits, should
not be required to apply the conflicts rules of the state in which it is
sitting, this is true a fortiori when such extra-state process is available to
parties contending on the merits and the danger of interstate forum-
shopping is dramatically increased."'
At the present time, this kind of danger of interstate forum-shopping
has been created to a limited extent by the amendment to Rule 4(f) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which became effective on July 1,
1963. It reads, in part, as follows:
In addition, persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to
Rule 13(h) [parties other than those to the original action
whose presence is required for the granting of complete relief
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim] or Rule
14 [brought in by defendant as third-party defendants], or as
additional parties to a pending action pursuant to Rule 19 [per-
sons who are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties if
complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties],
may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of
subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the state but
within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from
the place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is
assigned or transferred for trial . .12
Although there is a limit of 100 miles on the out-of-state service under
this rule, Professor Vestal has pointed out that in many of our multi-
state metropolitan areas "the federal court will be able to reach vast popu-
lation centers outside the state in which the court is sitting."' 3 When so
doing, the federal court should be free to apply its own criteria for choice
of governing state law.
Even greater opportunities to use federal courts as devices for inter-
state forum-shopping would be created by enactment of an amendment to
the Judicial Code recommended in a Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts, sponsored by the American Law In-
stitute."" The study suggests giving federal district courts "original
151. See Freund, mupra note 149, at 1211-12; Vestal, Erie RR. v. Tompkins: A
Projection, 48 Iowa L. REv. 248, 269 (1963).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
153. Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: The x963
Changes i; Federal Ride 4, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1053, 1065 (1963).
154. ALl STUDY.
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jurisdiction of any civil action in which the several defendants who are
necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim are not all
amenable to process in any one territorial jurisdiction and one of any
two adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the other a citizen or sub-
ject of another territorial jurisdiction."' 55  In order to make such juris-
diction effective, nation-wide service of process is provided.' Whatever
the merits or demerits of this proposal on other grounds, it is commend-
able that, as a correlate of this expansion of judicial jurisdiction, the
study provides that "the district court may make its own determination
as to which State rule of decision is applicable."' 7
A somewhat similar danger of subjecting a party to the law of a
state he might not otherwise have been subjected to is presented by Sec-
tion 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to, any other district or division where it might have been
brought."' 58  But what conflicts rules are to be applied-those of the
state from which the action is transferred, those of the state to which it is
transferred or those fashioned by the federal courts?
The few federal cases in point have decided in favor of the law of
the state from which transfer is made, at least so far as the applicable
statute of limitations is concerned.' 59 H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon
reaches this same result for the law applicable generally to claims that
could have been brought by the plaintiff in the transferor state. 00 The
study referred to above recommends codifying this result in the Judicial
Code on the ground that, "so long as Klaxon stands (and the Reporters
remain of the opinion that it should), an independent federal choice-of-
law rule applicable in transfer cases only seems logically impossible to
justify."16' Furthermore, "the effect is to give the plaintiff the benefit
which traditionally he has had in the selection of a forum with favorable
choice-of-law rules.'
62
There are several answers that might be made to this argument.
First of all, the plaintiff is not "traditionally" entitled to select an in-
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id. at 27
157. Id. at 28.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
159. H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 83
S. Ct 876 (1963) ; Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950) ;
Gomez v. The S.S. Dorothy, 183 F. Supp. 499 (D. P.R. 1959); Hargrove v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 153 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
160. Supra note 159. But cf. Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655, 656-57 (6th Cir.
1962) (dictum) (law of transferee state).
161. ALI STUDY 66-67.
162. Id. at 66.
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convenient forum. But for the flexibility that 1404(a) provides when
the plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum, the sanction might be
dismissal of the complaint and with it the plaintiff's advantage in being
able to select his law with his forum. Because transfer under section
1404(a) is made for "the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice," the state to which transfer is made is likely to have
far closer connections with the parties and the transaction in controversy
and the probabilities are that its law will be more appropriate for applica-
tion. From this standpoint, it would seem preferable to apply the law of
the state to which transfer is made, including its conflicts rules." 3 Such
a result, however, might turn defendant's motion for transfer under
1404(a) into a device for interstate forum-shopping of the kind con-
demned above. In view of all this, it may be that the best solution in
transferred cases is to permit the federal courts to make their own de-
termination of which state law is most appropriately applicable to the case
at bar, and this result is not "logically impossible to justify."
VII. CoNcLusION
What is needed now is not major surgery, not an overruling of Erie
or even of Klaxon, if, in regard to Klaxon, one puts aside the suggestion
that application of Delaware law to affect the result on the merits, al-
though under a "procedural" label, should be a violation of due process.
It is desirable that advantage be taken of the "countervailing considera-
tions" concept articulated in Byrd to avoid blind adherence to the outcome-
determinative test in situations where the harm caused thereby far ex-
ceeds any ill effects stemming from different results being reached by
state and federal courts sitting in the same state. Though there are many
situations in which it is debatable whether this is so, the following stand
out as the situations in which it is most strongly arguable that a federal
district court should not be required to follow the conflicts rules of the
state in which it is sitting: cases under the Federal Interpleader Act;
cases in which a party utilizes federal process beyond the boundaries of
the forum state, such as is now possible under Rule 4(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; actions transferred under Section 1404(a) of
the Judicial Code.
If, in these few extreme situations, one is still disturbed by the fact
that a different result may be obtained across the courthouse square, the
solution is in terms of making the state courts conform to the federal
conflicts rule. There are several devices available for this.
163. See Braucher, The Icoe'venient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908, 937(1947); Freund, supra note 149, at 1211.
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First, there might be an expansion of due process and full faith and
credit limitations on a state's choice of law. It would be undesirable,
however, in the present state of development of conflict rules, to limit a
state's application of its own law to advance its own legitimate interests,
except in circumstances where this would result in outrageous surprise
to one of the litigants, or in those few instances where the state's legiti-
mate interests are overshadowed by the need for a nationally uniform
result under the public act, record or judicial proceeding of a sister state.
An example of this latter proposition is compelling a forum state to en-
force a judgment of a sister state although a contrary judgment might
constitutionally have been obtained at the forum. There is room, though,
for making it dearer that a state which does not have sufficient contact
with the parties or with the transaction to have a legitimate interest in
effecting the result on the merits may not do so under the guise of apply-
ing its "procedure." Ironically, Klaxon itself might be the first to fall
under such a modest expansion of due process standards. Further, the
time is ripe for cautious use of the "equal protection" clause of the four-
tenth amendment to eliminate some of the irrational classifications which
still pervade conflicts dogma.
Beyond this, state conformity to federal conflicts rules must await
the day, should it ever come, when objective, informed and intelligent ap-
praisal of the situation leads to the conclusion that an overwhelming need
for a nationally uniform conflicts doctrine requires that choice of law in
interstate transactions be made a federal question. Even now, as good a
case can be made for federal standards for choice of law as for a ship-
owner's liability to one not a member of the crew who, while calling on a
seaman friend, trips on a boat docked in New York harbor.'64 Perhaps
competition from "common markets" abroad will cause this day to arrive
or will hasten its arrival.'65 But if and when such a day should come, it
would be well to arrange the relevant statutory and decisional framework
so that this "federal question" does not provide an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction, 6' just as today a claim that a state's conflict rule
164. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) ;
cf. Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 663,
665 (1963) (no federal interest apparent in personal injury cases arising from pleasure
boating).
165. Cf. Hancher, The Commerce Clause and A Common Market, 8 S.D. L. REv.
1, 2, 22 (1963).
166. Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)
(admiralty not an independent basis for jurisdiction on the law side of a federal
court) ; Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, writ of cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) (suits
involving application of the federal Arbitration Act do not furnish an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction) ; Boner, Erie v. Tompkin.s: A Study in Judicial Prece-
260
THE ERIE DOCTRINE 261
violates due process or denies full faith and credit does not provide such
a basis. Any good that may come from the studies devoted to reducing
the flood of diversity cases would be swept away by such a "federal
question" cloudburst.
dent, 40 TEXAS L. Rev. 509, 520 (1962) ("laws of the United States" include only
statutes).
